

## Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W  
-----100380 311333Z /40

R 311200Z JAN 78  
FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4798  
INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS  
AMEMBASSY BONN  
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS  
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
AMCONSUL MUNICH  
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA  
AMEMBASSY PARIS  
AMEMBASSY ROME  
USMISSION USNATO

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 BELGRADE 0715

EXDIS

ALSO FOR USEEC

E O 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PGOV, NATO, MASS, EEC, US YO  
SUBJECT: THE WEST'S RELATIONS WITH YUGOSLAVIA (PARR II)  
-- ACTION AGENDA

REF: BELGRADE 0714

1. IT IS OBVIOUSLY EASIER TO DESCRIBE THE WEAKNESS OF THE  
WEST'S PRESENT RELATIONSHIP WITH YUGOSLAVIA DN TO SET OUT  
OBJECTIVES (REFTEL) THAN TO PERSUADE OUR ALLIES TO DO  
ANYTHING ABOUT THEM. WE RECOGNIZE THAT NATO PROBABLY WILL  
BE, AT BEST, RELUCTANT TO TAKE ANY CONCRETE ACTIONS IN

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RELATION TO YUGOSLAVIA, AND THAT THE EC COULD WELL VIEW OUR  
INITIATIVES AS "INTERFERENCE". AND WE ARE AWARE THAT  
YUGOSLAVS WOULD BE HYPERSENSITIVE TO ANY PUBLIC  
REFERENCE TO THE WEST'S ACTING AS A "BLOCK" IN ITS  
POLICIES TOWARD THIS COUNTRY (THEY MIGHT BE EVEN MORE  
CONCERNED, HOWEVER, IF THEY KNEW HOW LITTLE WE ARE  
REALLY DOING).

2. THUS, OUR HOPES HERE ARE MODEST. IT IS MORE IMPORTANT THAT THIS NEW PERSPECTIVE AND ATTITUDE BE FORSTERED IN THE WEST THAN FOR ANY ONE OR GROUP OF THESE SPECIFIC PROPOALS TO BE ADOPTED. IT MAY BE THAT IF WE CAN MAKE OUR ALLIES AWARE OF THE WEAK LINKS IN THE WEST'S FABRIC OF RELATIONS WITH YUGOSLAVIA IT WILL LEAD TO GREATER CONSULTATION AND, PERHAPS, TO SOME ACTIONS WHICH OTHERWISE WOULD NOT OCCUR. AS PREVIOUSLY STATED, EACH WESTERN COUNTRY'S TENDENCY TO THINK ONLY IN BILATERAL TERMS TENDS TO IGNORE LARGER AND MORE IMPORANT TRENDS, TO UNDERESTIMATE OUR POSSIBILITIES AND OVERESTIMATE THE INEVITABILITY OF A YUGOSLAV SLID EASTWARD. IT LEADS TO PREOCCUPATION WITH YUGOSLAV DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS AND SOVIET INTENTIONS, AND LITTLE ATTENTION TO WHAT THE WEST, IS, CAN OR SHOULD BE DOING.

3. THE PROPOSALS WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO GENERATE IN THIS EMB ARE GEARED MORE TO LAUNCHING A DIALOGUE THAN TO PRESCRIBING ITS CONTENT: WE ARE CONSCIOUS THAT THEY ARE LARGELY ORGANIZATION RATHER THAN SUBSTANTIVE IN CHARTER. BUT ONCE LAUNCHED DOWN THE ROAD TO CONSIDERING THE OVERALL RELATIONSHIP OF YUGOSLAVIA TO THE WEST, WE HOPE THAT BOTH WASHINGTON AND OUR ALLIES WOULD GENERATE A MORE PROFOUND ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEM AND MORE IMAGINATIVE POLICY IDEAS THAN WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO COME UP WITH HERE. THUS WE OFFER  
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THE FOLLOWING SUGGESTIONS IN FULL RECOGNITION THAT THEY ARE LESS THAN EARTH-SHAKING IN THEIR SIGNIFICANCE.

4. NATO: AS A FIRST STEP WE SUGGEST THAT WE ENCOURAGE NATO SECRETARY GENERAL LUNS TO CALL ANOTHER ONE OF HIS INFREQUENT PRIVATE OFFICE MEETINGS OF NATO AMBASSADOR ON YUGOSLAVIA. IN THAT MEETING WE COULD DESCRIBE AND EXPRESS OUR CONCERN ABOUT THE PRESENT STATE OF THE WEST'S OVERALL RELATIONSHIP WITH YUGOSLAVIA, STRESSING THE FACT THAT WHAT THE WEST DOES NOW TO BUILD TIES WITH AND CONFIDENCE IN YUGOSLAVIA MAY WELL BE MORE IMPORTANT THAN WHAT WE CAN DO AFTER TITO GOES. WE COULD EXPLICITLY RECOGNIZE THAT THERE ARE FEW THINGS WE CAN OR SHOULD DO TOGETHER, BUT WE COULD EXPRESS THE HOPE THAT AS WE WILL ALL BE IN THE TUB TOGETHER IF THINGS GO WRONG, WE HAVE A COMMON INTEREST IN ENSURING THAT THE SUM TOTAL OF OUR INDIVIDUAL EFFORTS IS ADEQUATE. WE COULD STATE THAT THE U.S. DOES NOT PRETEND TO KNOW WHAT OTHERS SHOULD DO, BUT THAT WE BELIEVE CERTAIN GENERAL OBJECTIVES ARE SELF-EVIDENT. THUS, IN THE MILITARY SPHERE IT IS NOT IN OUR INTEREST TO FORCE THE YUGOSLAVS TO REMAIN HEAVILY DEPENDENT ON THE SOVIET UNION FOR ARMS.

IN THE ECONOMIC FIELD OUR PRESENT POSITION IS STRONGER,  
BUT SOME TRENDS ARE OMINOUS AND THERE IS STILL GREAT  
ROOM FOR EXPANDED LINKS WITH  
THE WEST. LIKEWISE, THE PROBLEM OF TERRORISM IS MORE  
OR LESS MANAGEABLE NOW BUT COULD ASSUME SERIOUS PROPOR-  
TIONS. WE SHOULD ENCOURAGE OTHERS TO COMMENT, AND  
LUNS TO HAVE MORE REGULAR MEETINGS.

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AMEMBASSY PARIS  
AMEMBASSY ROME  
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EXDIS

5. MUCH BEYOND THIS WORTHILE BUT STILL LIMITED EXERCISE  
IN EXPRESSING HIGH-LEVEL USG CONCERN AND SUPPORT FOR  
GREATER WESTERN COOPERATION WITH YUGOSLAVIA WE MAY NOT  
BE ABLE TO GO IN NATO. IDEALLY OTHER STEPS SHOULD BE  
TAKEN AS WELL. FOR EXAMPLE THE MILITARY COMMITTEE COULD  
GO BEYOND PRESENT NATO STUDIES OF YUGOSAVIA'S ORDER OF  
BATTLE TO ANALYZE ITS PRESENT DEPENDENCE ON THE EAST FOR  
ARMS, ITS LEGITIMATE DEFENSE NEEDS AND AREAS WHERE THE  
WEST COULD AND SHOULD BE MORE RESPONSIVE TO GOY REQUESTS.  
THROUGH A COMMON PICTURE OF YUGOSAVIA'S OVERALL SITUATION  
WE MIGHT BE ABLE TO REDUCE THE RELUCTANCE IN MANY NATO  
COUNTRIES TO SELL THE YUGOSLAVS THE THINGS THEY NEED FOR

THEIR DEFENSE.

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6. EC. WE ARE ALREADY TALKING WITH THE EC AND ITS MEMBER COUNTRIES ABOUT THE STATE OF ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH YUGOSLAVIA AND OUR CONCERN FOR THE FUTURE. WE HAVE NOTHING TO ADD TO OUR, USEC AND THE DEPT'S PREVIOUS CABLES ON THIS SUBJECT. WE WOULD NOTE ONLY THAT BY COMMUNICATING THE KIND OF LARGER FRAMEWORK WE DESCRIBED IN PART I, AND SUGGEST FOR PRESENTATION IN THE LINS GROUP, WE BELIEVE WE WOULD BE GIVING A BROADER CONTEXT, GREATER WEIGHT AND SERIOUSNESS TO OUR SEPARATE APPROACHES ON ECONOMIC MATTERS.

7. NATIONALISM AND TERRORISM. HERE AGAIN WE HAVE NO ILLUSIONS ABOUT HOW MUCH WE CAN ACHIEVE, BUT WE BELIEVE THAT EVEN MODEST STEPS MAY YIELD WORTHWHILE RETURNS. THERE ALREADY MAY BE SOME DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE FBI, THE CIA AND THEIR RESPECTIVE COUNTERPARTS IN SOME OTHER COUNTRIES ABOUT YUGOSLAV-ORIENTED TERRORISM. WE WOULD BE INTERESTED IN LEARNING IF THIS EXISTS. IN ANY EVENT, WE RECOMMEND A WORKING GROUP MADE UP OF A LIMITED NUMBER OF RESPONSIBLE, AFFECTED GOVTS (WE HAVE IN MIND AUSTRALIA, CANADA, WEST GERMANY AS A FIRST CUT). THE DEPT'S OFFICE ON TERRORISM (MC/CT) MIGHT GET THIS UNDERWAY. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE AUSTRALIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY IS ESTABLISHING A SPECIAL OFFICE TO DEAL WITH YUGOSLAV-RELATED TERRORISM. WE ENVISION A PERIODIC EXCHANGE OF INFO ON CROSS-BORDER ACTIVITIES BY TERRORIST GROUPS AND SOME ASSESSMENT OF TERRORIST TRENDS, INCLUDING THE CHANCES FOR A MAJOR EXPANSION AT THE TIME TITO GOES AND WAYS TO FORESTALL OR CONTROL THIS.

8. DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS. THIS IS THE MOST DELICATE ISSUE OF ALL AND THE MOST DIFFICULT TO FIND WAYS TO ENCOURAGE OUR ALLIES TO PURSUE. AS WE NOTED IN

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PART I SOME WESTERN POLITICAL PARTIES ALREADY HAVE CLOSE TIES WITH YUGOSLAV POLITICAL BODIES, AND BOTH OUR OWN REPUBLICAN AND DEMOCRATIC PARTIES HAVE OFFERED TO HOST A DEL OF THE LCY IN THE U.S. IF WE ARE CONSCIOUS OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS DIMENSION, SPECIFIC OPPORTUNITIES TO ENCOURAGE IT WILL UNDOUBTEDLY ARISE. IT TOO COULD BE MENTIONED IN THE LINS GROUP, AND THE NEXT

NATO PARLIAMENTARIANS MEETING MIGHT WELL ADDRESS THIS SUBJECT.

9. BELGRADE. IF THE DEPT APPROVES, AMBASSADOR WOULD PROPOSE TO BRING TOGETHER COLLEAGUES FROM A FEW KEY WESTERN COUNTRIES HERE TO DISCUSS OUR CONCERN AND WHAT WE BELIEVE SHOULD BE OUR COMMON INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES. WE WOULD HOPE THAT THIS DIALOGUE MIGHT DEVELOP INFORMALLY INTO A REGULAR EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THE CURRENT STATE OF YUGOSLAVIA, AND THE WEST'S PROGRESS OR LACK THEREOF TOWARD ACHIEVING THE KIND OF OVERALL RELATIONSHIP WITH YUGOSLAVIA WHICH WE SHOULD IDEALLY HAVE IN PLACE WHEN TITO GOES.  
EAGLEBURGER

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## Message Attributes

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